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Summary
Autonomous detection systems (ADSs) are under development to detect agents of biologic and chemical terror in the environ-
ment. These systems will eventually be able to detect biologic and chemical hazards reliably and provide approximate real-time
alerts that an agent is present. One type of ADS that tests specifically for Bacillus anthracis is being deployed in hundreds of postal
distribution centers across the United States. Identification of aerosolized B. anthracis spores in an air sample can facilitate
prompt on-site decontamination of workers and subsequent administration of postexposure prophylaxis to prevent inhalational
anthrax.
Every employer who deploys an ADS should develop detailed plans for responding to a positive signal. Responding to ADS
detection of B. anthracis involves coordinating responses with community partners and should include drills and exercises with
these partners. This report provides guidelines in the following six areas: 1) response and consequence management planning,
including the minimum components of a facility response plan; 2) immediate response and evacuation; 3) decontamination of
potentially exposed workers to remove spores from clothing and skin and prevent introduction of B. anthracis into the worker’s
home and conveyances; 4) laboratory confirmation of an ADS signal; 5) steps for evaluating potentially contaminated environ-
ments; and 6) postexposure prophylaxis and follow-up.
Introduction
The risk for terrorist events involving the intentional air-
borne release of infectious agents has led to development of
new approaches for sampling and testing ambient air both
indoors and outdoors (1). One such approach is the use of an
autonomous detection system (ADS) that combines automated
air sampling and testing. An ADS continuously samples air
that impinges in a buffer solution. An automated detection
assay (e.g., a real-time polymerase chain reaction [PCR] test
or an immunoassay) analyzes the trapped material at a
defined sampling interval (e.g., every 1.5 hours). All ADSs
under development have a way of alerting authorities of a
positive signal. The result is an approximate real-time detec-
tion and alerting system.
One type of ADS, the Biohazard Detection System (BDS),
was developed under contract with the U.S. Postal Service
(USPS) specifically to detect aerosolized Bacillus anthracis
spores. USPS plans to install BDS in approximately 300 mail
processing and distribution centers (PDCs) across the United
States. PDCs have high-speed mail-handling equipment that
can aerosolize B. anthracis spores sent through the mail, as
demonstrated during the 2001 anthrax attacks. USPS will
install BDS devices on or near key equipment that processes
incoming mail (e.g., advanced facer-canceller system
machines). Identification of aerosolized B. anthracis spores in
an air sample is necessary for prompt on-site decontamina-
tion of workers and subsequent postexposure prophylaxis
(PEP) before the onset of symptoms and to interrupt the flow
of contaminated letters or packages into the postal stream.
This report provides voluntary guidance for employers, state
and local health departments, emergency responders, hospi-
tals, health-care providers, and others preparing to use an ADS
in a workplace with machinery or production facilities that
might aerosolize B. anthracis spores mechanically.
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* LRN laboratories are those that participate in a network of public health
laboratories meeting criteria specified by CDC in collaboration with partners.
Additional information is available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/lrn/factsheet.asp.
Background
Characteristics of Anthrax
Anthrax is a zoonotic disease caused by the spore-forming
bacterium Bacillus anthracis. B. anthracis spores remain viable
in the environment for years, representing a potential source
of infection. Anthrax occurs in humans in three clinical forms:
inhalational, gastrointestinal, and cutaneous. Inhalational
anthrax results from aerosolization of B. anthracis spores
through industrial processing or intentional release. Gas-
trointestinal or oropharyngeal forms of the disease result from
ingestion of infected undercooked or raw meat. Cutaneous
anthrax is the most common type of naturally acquired
anthrax infection and usually occurs after skin contact with
contaminated products from infected animals. Historically,
the case-fatality rate for cutaneous anthrax has been <1% with
antibiotic treatment and 20% without antibiotic treatment
(2–4). Case-fatality rates for inhalational anthrax are high,
even with appropriate antibiotics and supportive care (5).
Among the 18 cases of inhalational anthrax identified in the
United States during the 20th century, the overall case-fatality
rate was >75%. After the biologic terrorism attack in fall 2001
in which B. anthracis spores were released through the mail,
the case-fatality rate for patients with inhalational anthrax was
45% (5 of 11 cases) (5,6). The incubation period for anthrax
is usually <2 weeks; however, because of spore dormancy and
slow clearance from the lungs, the incubation period for
inhalational anthrax can be prolonged for months. This phe-
nomenon of delayed onset has not been recognized for cuta-
neous or gastrointestinal exposures. Discharges from cutaneous
lesions are potentially infectious, but person-to-person trans-
mission has been reported rarely. Person-to-person transmis-
sion of inhalational anthrax has not been documented.
B. anthracis is one of the biologic agents most likely to be
used as a weapon because 1) its spores are highly stable; 2) the
spores can infect through the respiratory route; and 3) the
resulting inhalational disease has a high case-fatality rate. In
1979 an unintentional release of B. anthracis spores from a
military microbiology facility in the former Soviet Union
resulted in 69 deaths (7). The anthrax outbreak after
B. anthracis spores were distributed through the U.S. mail sys-
tem in 2001 further underscores the dangers of this organism
as a terrorist threat (6).
After a terrorist attack, exposures to B. anthracis spores can
occur through primary and secondary aerosols. Primary aero-
sols are dispersions of particles in air resulting from a biologic
agent’s initial release, whether through a disseminating device
or through handling of an agent-containing package (e.g., in
mechanical processing of mail). Secondary aerosols result from
disruption and resuspension of settled particles. Through
agglomeration (to other spores or debris) or other changes,
these settled particles might not retain the characteristics of
the original material (8); consequently, resuspension can
result in larger diameter particle aerosols and lower airborne
concentrations, both of which decrease the risk for exposure
when compared with primary aerosols.
Particle sizes of primary and secondary aerosols vary. Air-
borne particles <100 µm in size compose an aerosol, whereas
particles >100 µm settle relatively quickly (8). Typical room
air velocities exceed the settling velocities of extremely small
particles (i.e., approximately 5 µm in diameter), and such
particles therefore tend to remain airborne for prolonged
periods (and can travel farther) before impacting or settling
on a surface. Particles composed of single spores or small clus-
ters of spores have diameters of a few micrometers (e.g., 5–10
µm) and move with general air-flow patterns without rapid
settling. Resuspension of settled particles depends on such fac-
tors as particle size and the type of surface on which the par-
ticles settle. Although resuspension of certain settled particles
requires substantial amounts of energy, lower energy activities
(e.g., paper handling, foot traffic, mail handling, and patting
of chairs) can reaerosolize settled B. anthracis spores (9,10).
The clinical and epidemiologic presentations of anthrax after
an intentional release vary by the population targeted, the




After an ADS is installed, a positive signal indicating pos-
sible presence of a biologic agent requires a coordinated, swift,
and effective response. Therefore, an ADS should only be
installed if
• an aerosol-generating machine or production step in that
workplace might result in the forceful mechanical aerosol
dispersion of B. anthracis spores;
• a Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory* can
perform timely testing to confirm a positive ADS signal;
• the quality of the ADS device meets the specifications
described in this report (see Laboratory Evaluation of a
Positive ADS Signal);
• policies and procedures to maintain the device exist and
are followed; and
• comprehensive planning has been conducted for
responding to a positive ADS signal.
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BOX 1. Facility plan guidelines for responding to a positive
signal from an autonomous detection system (ADS)
indicating possible presence of a biologic agent
Facility plans for responding to a positive ADS signal
should include, at a minimum, the following components:
• Description of the facility in which the ADS is placed,
including identification of all potentially aerosol-
generating equipment and a description of the heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system and
air-flow design.
• Immediate response protocols, including procedures for
shutting down operations, turning off HVAC units, and
evacuating personnel.
• Procedures to notify local emergency, law enforcement,
and public health authorities.
• Arrangements for confirming the positive ADS signal
by reanalysis in an LRN laboratory.
• Procedures to rapidly collect and transport the speci-
men to the LRN laboratory for confirmation.
• Accounting of
— personnel in the facility at the time of the signal,
and
— personnel who left the site during the ADS air-
sampling interval before the positive signal.
• Coordination with local emergency and law enforce-
ment authorities to contact any persons who left the
site during the ADS air-sampling interval before the
positive signal.
• Procedures and agreements with local first responders
to decontaminate potentially exposed employees.
• Arrangements with local public health authorities on
procedures for postexposure prophylaxis.
• Crisis-communication plans, including communication
channels and preplanned messages for employees and
the media.
• Continuity of operations plans.
• Employee education and drills.
• Follow-up with potentially exposed workers.
• Preliminary planning for short- and long-term recovery
(e.g., additional environmental sampling and decontami-
nation of the facility [this depends on incident circum-
stances, lead federal agency decisions, and other factors]).
Every employer who deploys an ADS should develop
detailed plans for responding to a positive signal (Box 1).
Responding to ADS detection of B. anthracis involves coordi-
nating responses with community partners and should include
drills and exercises with these partners. Response planning
should involve the following entities:
• Local and state health departments. Because health
departments will provide guidance on prophylaxis, labo-
ratory confirmation, and long-term follow-up for employ-
ees potentially exposed, they should be made aware of the
presence of an ADS and should devise response plans in
case of an alert.
• Local first responders. Because local first-response orga-
nizations (e.g., police, fire, hazardous materials, and emer-
gency medical services [EMS]) are expected to respond to
a suspected terrorist attack, facilities implementing ADSs
should involve local first responders in response planning.
Employers should also consider contacting the regional
office of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, who
will likely be involved in facility decontamination when
necessary.
• Local medical facilities. Employees potentially exposed
to B. anthracis spores might seek medical evaluation and
treatment at local medical facilities even if they already
have undergone decontamination, if appropriate, or have
been started on PEP. In addition, any potentially ex-
posed employees who believe they are experiencing symp-
toms related to the exposure or PEP should seek medical
evaluation. Therefore, involving one or more local medi-
cal facilities in response planning is prudent. Relying on
the local health department to provide guidance for
these arrangements is also appropriate.
• Law enforcement officials. Terrorism is a federal offense
and a worksite with a positive ADS signal is a potential
crime scene. Therefore, any employer using an ADS
device should inform the regional office of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and state and local law
enforcement officials about its installation and include
them in response planning. Agreeing in advance with FBI
and other law enforcement agencies which will be the lead
agency during the initial response is essential. Clear com-
mand and control procedures are critical when respond-
ing to a potential terrorist event.
• Local media representatives. Communicating quickly and
effectively with the public is essential. Therefore,
employers should consider involving local media represen-
tatives as soon as an ADS is installed. Response plans should
include a media-planning component, including pre-event
development of messages, information packages, and des-
ignated spokespersons. Facility managers might prepare a
tour and briefing for local media representatives so they
understand what an ADS is, what the probable responses
will be when a detection occurs, and whom to contact for
information. This will increase the likelihood that media
will contribute positively to the public health response in
the event of a positive ADS signal.
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When a positive ADS signal occurs,
• work activities should stop immediately;
• any potentially aerosol-generating equipment should be
stopped and secured;
• HVAC units serving the production or processing area
should be turned off (however, local exhaust ventilation
on machines should be left on);
• personnel should be evacuated to safe locations (see
Recommendations for Evacuation and Personal Decon-
tamination);
• local and federal law enforcement officials and public
health officials should be notified;
• all workers should be accounted for immediately to
ensure their evacuation; and
• personal identification and contact information should
be gathered.
Management and Decontamination
of Workers Potentially Exposed
to B. anthracis
Every employer who uses an ADS device is responsible for
coordinating in advance personal decontamination procedures
through agreements with collaborating partners (e.g., EMS
or public health agencies). During pre-event planning, the
employer should work with local first responders to ensure
decontamination activities will be performed appropriately and
in a timely manner.
Persons in a workplace containing an ADS device face three
key exposure pathways of concern: 1) aerosolization; 2) direct
contamination of skin, outer layers of clothing, and work-
place surfaces; and 3) indirect contamination of a vehicle or
home by spores transported by clothing or exposed skin. The
occurrence of inhalational and cutaneous anthrax among postal
workers during 2001 underscores the importance of address-
ing the first two exposure pathways. Limited information is
available about the extent and likelihood of risk from off-site
contamination; during the 2001 anthrax outbreak, this risk
appeared minimal. Personal decontamination is intended to
minimize the risk of off-site contamination and to prevent




Home contamination from work-contaminated clothing has
been well-documented for a number of substances (11). A
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1995 review by CDC’s National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) documented cases in which sub-
stances were brought home inadvertently on work clothing.
The majority involved such substances as lead, asbestos,
beryllium, pesticides, and other chemicals in industrial, con-
struction, agriculture, or cottage industry settings (11); two
cases involved infectious agents. A task force identified criti-
cal gaps in knowledge regarding the magnitude of take-home
exposures and their potential health consequences (12).
Minimal information exists about take-home exposures
associated with B. anthracis. The only known cases of anthrax
among family members of exposed workers are two cutane-
ous cases from the early 1900s involving spouses of wool sort-
ers employed at English textile operations (13). In a 1978
naturally occurring outbreak of anthrax associated with a tex-
tile operation in North Carolina, one of four vacuum cleaner
dust samples from the homes of textile-mill workers was posi-
tive for B. anthracis, indicating that workers carried spores
home on their clothing. However, no cases of anthrax were
reported among workers’ families (14).
Although take-home exposure was not systematically stud-
ied during the 2001 outbreaks associated with the release of
weaponized B. anthracis, the experiences of those cases might
be relevant to ADS use. No anthrax cases occurred among
family members of postal workers during the 2001 outbreaks,
indicating that risk was low for inhalational and cutaneous
anthrax for family members from contaminated clothing. The
2001 anthrax cases in media offices provided evidence that
home contamination could occur from contaminated letters
opened at work. For example, environmental surface swab
samples were positive in residences of certain persons who
came into direct physical contact with opened, contaminated
letters in New York City [personal communication, Jeanine
Prud’homme, M.S., New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene, New York, New York, February 14,
2004]. No environmental sampling was reported for possible
home contamination among Capitol Hill workers associated
with the opened letter to Senator Tom Daschle of South
Dakota. However, off-site contamination by equipment and
clothing occurred when members of the U.S. Capitol Police
Hazardous Device Unit who had responded to the letter
returned to their office. Environmental sampling located con-
tamination in vehicles and office-space surfaces where equip-
ment was handled. No anthrax cases were reported among
family members from home contamination in any of these
instances.
To prevent or minimize exposure to workers’ families,
occupational health standards and guidelines typically call for
basic hygiene practices (e.g., leaving work clothing and shoes
at the job site, washing, and, in certain cases, showering after
work). Such precautions traditionally target employees who
routinely work with harmful substances (e.g., lead and asbes-
tos) and who can reduce take-home exposures to these occu-
pational contaminants (15). Basic hygiene recommendations
also exist for managing potential exposures after a B. anthracis
attack against a civilian population. The current consensus
statement recommends that “any person coming in direct
physical contact with a substance alleged to be containing
B. anthracis should thoroughly wash the exposed skin and
articles of clothing with soap and water” (16). Although the
risk of cutaneous anthrax from off-site transport appears low,
because of gaps in knowledge about this risk, a positive signal
from an ADS should elicit a conservative approach to
personal decontamination (Box 2).
Recommendations for Evacuation
and Personal Decontamination
The primary goal of using an ADS is to prevent inhala-
tional anthrax through early recognition of and response to
an exposure situation, including early initiation of PEP. Aero-
solization or direct physical contact can result in deposition
of spores on the outerwear of employees and subsequent trans-
port off site. Because limited scientific data exist regarding
B. anthracis and personal decontamination, these recommen-
dations are based primarily on available information; general
industrial-hygiene concepts, principles, and practices; anal-
ogy to other contaminants and industrial settings; and a pru-
dent public health approach. These recommendations might
change as information regarding the efficacy of control systems,
decontamination methods, and safe work practices becomes
available.
Employers, in consultation with first responders and public
health departments, should determine exit routes and places
of refuge. An outdoor refuge location might be considered
but can be problematic because of weather, security, or other
concerns. A physically separate building or space inside the
potentially contaminated building might also merit consider-
ation, by using the following criteria:
• An alternate indoor location should not share an HVAC
system with the production area experiencing the posi-
tive signal.
• An alternate indoor location should not share an HVAC
system with spaces where unexposed workers are located.
• Unexposed workers should be able to avoid exposure while
evacuating the facility and should not pass through the
production area experiencing the positive signal.
• Decontamination groups should be able to be segregated
to the greatest extent possible to avoid cross-contamination
and provide ready access to decontamination as required.
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Worker category Evacuation/decontamination procedures
Group 1. Workers who did not enter the production
area containing the ADS device during the sampling and
testing period (e.g., 1.5 hours) before the positive ADS
signal and who were not in an area that shares a heating,
ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system with
the production area experiencing the positive signal
Group 2. All workers who were present in the produc-
tion area containing the ADS device during the sam-
pling and testing period before the positive ADS signal
or who were in an area that shares an HVAC system
with the production area experiencing the positive signal
Group 3. Workers identified in advance as particularly
at risk of exposure to a higher concentration of depos-
ited spores as a result of direct physical contact with
aerosol-generating equipment
Evacuate; no special decontamination steps are needed.
1. Evacuate immediately.
2. Remove potentially contaminated outer garments at the site.
3. Wash all areas of skin (e.g., face, arms, hands, and legs)
exposed at the time of the positive ADS signal with mild
soap and copious amounts of warm water.
4. Use replacement outer garments and shoes.
1. Evacuate immediately.
2. Remove potentially contaminated garments at the site.
3. Take a shower at the site to wash all areas of exposed
and unexposed skin with mild soap and warm water.
4. Use replacement outer garments, underwear, and shoes.
BOX 2. Interim guidelines for evacuation and personal decontamination of workers after a positive autonomous detection
system (ADS) signal indicates presence of a biologic agent
Workers should be categorized into three groups for evacu-
ation and decontamination procedures (Box 2). Group 1
includes those workers who did not enter the production area
containing the ADS device during the sampling and testing
period (e.g., 1.5 hours) before the positive ADS signal and
whose work locations do not share an HVAC system with the
production area experiencing the positive signal. Group 2
includes all workers who were present in the production area
containing the ADS device during the sampling and testing
period before the positive ADS signal or who are located in
any space that shares an HVAC system with the production
area experiencing the positive signal. Group 3 includes all
workers identified in advance as particularly at risk of expo-
sure to a higher concentration of deposited spores as a result
of direct physical contact with aerosol-generating equipment.
Workers in these groups should be evacuated and decontami-
nated as follows:
• Group 1. Those workers who were not in the same pro-
duction area as the ADS and who were not in an area that
shares an HVAC system with the affected area do not
require decontamination. They should be evacuated safely
by pathways and to places of refuge separate from Groups
2 and 3.
• Group 2. Workers in the production area should evacu-
ate immediately. They should take basic precautions to
minimize any likelihood of off-site contamination from
settled aerosols on the outer layer of worker clothing and
on any exposed skin. Removal of outer garments and
washing of skin (e.g. face, arms, hands, and legs) are basic
steps to preventing inadvertent contamination of worker
homes. Approximately 70%–95% of decontamination can
be accomplished by removing outer clothing and shoes
(17–20). Washing of exposed skin should also include
washing of any exposed jewelry (e.g., rings, bracelets, neck-
laces, or wristwatches) or glasses. Contamination of
inner clothing layers is not likely for these employees.
Removed outer clothing should be bagged carefully and
left at the facility pending final disposition.
Upon arriving home, workers can shower and wash
their hair to further reduce any contamination concerns.
Showering with warm soap and water and cleaning sys-
tematically from the head down is widely considered the
most effective and preferred method for removing haz-
ardous substances from skin (17,18,21,22). One efficacy
study of hand hygiene reported that washing 10–60 sec-
onds with soap and water or using a chlorine-containing
towel to wipe contaminated areas will eliminate 1.5–2
log10 of surrogate spores; conversely, waterless rubs with
ethyl alcohol were not effective (23).
• Group 3. As part of coordinated pre-event planning,
employers should identify the limited number of employ-
ees likely to experience a higher concentration of depos-
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ited spores from direct physical contact with equipment
that might be associated with B. anthracis aerosolization
(e.g., USPS workers operating canceling machines and
other mail-processing machines at and immediately down-
stream or upstream of the ADS device). Where feasible,
Group 3 workers should take a separate path to a place of
refuge where more extensive decontamination is planned.
If any groups must exit by the same route, they should be
identified and separated subsequently to minimize cross-
contamination.
Because of the risk that inner clothing or skin might
become contaminated when outer clothing is removed,
Group 3 workers who performed high-risk tasks during
the air-sampling and testing period before the ADS alert
could be directed to a separate decontamination area to
shower to wash all areas of exposed and unexposed skin
or use other nonshower options listed later in this report.
Using a separate decontamination space for this group
will minimize cross-contamination.
Only those persons thought to be at risk of substan-
tially higher levels of contamination as a result of direct
physical contact with aerosol-generating equipment are
candidates for the higher degree of on-site decontamina-
tion afforded by showers. If the employer review of job
functions does not identify any such possibilities, that fact
should be noted in the facility plan, and a supplemental
decontamination step is not needed.
Logistical considerations for decontamination include the
following:
• Replacement garments and shoes should be stored in an
area that would be accessible after evacuation of the pro-
duction area. This can include having employees bring a
change of personal clothing and shoes for storage at
appropriate locations, providing a supply of disposable
clothing, or a combination of both.
• All clothing and shoes removed after evacuation should
be placed in a plastic bag and remain on-site at a pre-
designated location pending LRN laboratory testing of
the ADS sample, after which a decision can be made
regarding final disposition.
• Evacuation and wash-up location(s) should be identified
in advance.
• Extra decontamination measures for Group 3 should be
arranged in advance. A facility might already have show-
ers in a separate building that can be used in the event of
an ADS signal. If not, employers should work with emer-
gency responders to address this concern. Where logisti-
cal obstacles are severe, first responders and employers
can evaluate nonshower options (e.g., misting of clothing
or use of high-efficiency particulate air [HEPA] vacuums
with appropriate nozzles designed to clean external cloth-
ing surfaces). The parties should consult with NIOSH or
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration on
procedural use of these alternatives.
• Employee training and drills can help allay employee anxi-
ety about responding to a positive signal and improve the
quality and efficiency of an actual response.
• Any workers who were on-site during the sampling and
testing period but who went home in the period before
the positive ADS signal during which aerosolized spores
might have been present (which depends on sampling and
testing intervals of the particular ADS), should be in-
structed to place their work clothing in a plastic bag for
further disposition, wash exposed skin, and shower, if they
would have been categorized as being in Groups 2 or 3.
Other general considerations include the following:
• Emergency-preparedness plans for certain facilities might
include installation of local exhaust ventilation at pinch
points (i.e., locations in the pathway where a letter or
parcel is compressed by equipment) where aerosols can
be generated. Using well-designed and maintained venti-
lation on all relevant processing equipment should cap-
ture aerosols as they are created and before workers inhale
them or are contaminated by deposition of spores. This
usually will reduce or even eliminate the need for per-
sonal decontamination of workers in Groups 2 or 3. Plan-
ners should consider the potential benefits of keeping
HEPA-filtered local exhaust systems operating while gen-
eral HVAC and other equipment are turned off. Employ-
ers can modify their response plans after such ventilation
systems have been installed and successfully tested.
• Postal facilities using BDS units probably have already
eliminated use of compressed air for maintenance clean-
ing. Nonpostal facility managers should examine mainte-
nance procedures regarding use of compressed air and
similar aerosol-generating practices.
Laboratory Evaluation
of a Positive ADS Signal
A well-designed ADS has four attributes: 1) a stand-alone
and contained configuration; 2) ability to collect a substantial
volume of sample; 3) use of a detection technology requiring
minimal manual attention; and 4) control procedures to en-
sure adequate assay performance, including lack of inhibition
and reagent stability. Ideally, the assay used in an ADS will
have extremely high positive and negative predictive values.
Key factors for ensuring accurate and consistent results from
ADS devices are development and implementation of main-
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tenance plans with rigid quality-assurance controls. These plans
should describe specific policies and procedures for use and
maintenance of an ADS. If all these criteria are met, a high
level of confidence can be ensured that a positive ADS signal
represents a true B. anthracis aerosolization event.
Nevertheless, a positive ADS signal should be confirmed by
an LRN laboratory using both PCR assay and culture. Policies
and procedures for specimen management, including chain of
custody, should be arranged in advance. Finally, persons should
be identified and trained who can ensure correct collection and
transport of the ADS specimen to the LRN laboratory.
Initial Environmental Evaluation
Environmental sampling in coordination with public health
and law enforcement immediately after an ADS signal might
be necessary to address both public health and law enforce-
ment goals. The primary law enforcement goal is to assist the
criminal investigation by finding the source of contamina-
tion. The immediate public health goal is to determine who is
in need of PEP (in addition to those who were either in the
production area or in a location that shared air-handling with
the production area). For example, if a letter causes a positive
ADS signal at a PDC, it would be important to ascertain which
employees, if any, at other facilities through which the letter
has passed, should be considered for PEP. Sampling the
machine where the ADS is located to confirm a positive ADS
signal might also be appropriate. Information about the
extent of contamination at the facility is important but is a
less-immediate need. Nasal swabs of potentially exposed work-
ers to test for B. anthracis are not recommended.
General guidance, criteria, and recommendations for sam-
pling of B. anthracis-contaminated areas are available elsewhere
(24). Planning for environmental sampling activities before
activating an ADS is necessary to ensure that
• appropriately trained and protected personnel are identified and
available to conduct sampling and facility investigation;
• response personnel are certified in use of protective
equipment (25) and personal decontamination before
entering the facility;
• appropriate equipment and sampling supplies are
available;
• pre-event notification and response protocols are estab-
lished for receipt and rapid processing of samples;
• targeted sampling plans are developed, including identi-
fying locations to sample to maximize the likelihood of
finding contamination and to expedite results (sampling
should use such methods as HEPA sock vacuum meth-
ods and wet wipes that maximize sensitivity and allow
larger areas to be sampled [26]); and
• sampling plans take into consideration other locations
through which the B. anthracis-containing package or item
might have passed and whether sampling is needed in
other facilities to make appropriate PEP recommenda-
tions for personnel at those sites.
Postexposure Prophylaxis
and Follow-Up
Inhaled spores can remain dormant in the lungs or lym-
phatic system for weeks to months before germination (27,28).
After germination in alveolar macrophages, vegetative organ-
isms can replicate and cause symptomatic disease. Reported
incubation periods have ranged from 1 to 43 days after initial
exposure but can be affected by the dose of B. anthracis
inhaled and the use of antibiotics (1,5). Delayed disease onset
is not known to occur with cutaneous or gastrointestinal
exposures.
Two methods exist to protect against B. anthracis after the
spores have reached the vegetative state. The first is to have
adequate levels of antibiotics in the bloodstream to kill veg-
etative bacteria. The second is to have adequate anti-B. anthracis
antibodies in the bloodstream when vegetative bacteria appear.
Two U.S. national advisory bodies have considered PEP strat-
egies for preventing inhalational anthrax among persons
exposed to aerosolized spores. Both groups, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the Johns
Hopkins Working Group on Civilian Biodefense, concluded
that on the basis of available data, the best means for prevent-
ing inhalational anthrax is prolonged antibiotic therapy in
conjunction with anthrax vaccination (29,30). The 2002
Institute of Medicine report on anthrax vaccine safety and
efficacy also concluded that on the basis of limited animal
studies, anthrax vaccine administered in combination with
antibiotics after exposure to B. anthracis spores might help
prevent development of inhalational anthrax (31).
In PEP, antibiotics are initiated as soon as possible after
actual or suspected inhalation of B. anthracis spores and
anthrax vaccination is started to stimulate production of pro-
tective antibodies, so that by the time exposed persons com-
plete their course of antibiotics, they will have sufficient
antibodies to protect them against residual spores. Although
the effect of delayed PEP or treatment on survival can only be
approximated, mathematical models indicate that for each day
PEP is delayed after an aerosol exposure, the case-fatality rate
can increase by 5%–10% (32).
The available anthrax vaccine, BioThrax™ [BioPort Cor-
poration, Lansing, Michigan], is not licensed for PEP, for use
as a 3-dose PEP regimen, or for use in children. Therefore, a
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postexposure regimen of antibiotics and anthrax vaccine can
only be administered under an Investigational New Drug
(IND) application as part of an emergency-health interven-
tion. If the vaccine is released for use in emergency situations,
CDC will provide the IND protocol for delivery and use in
collaboration with state and local health departments. In con-
junction with the 3-dose regimen of vaccine, 60 days of
selected oral antibiotics (i.e., ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, or
amoxicillin) should be administered to persons potentially
exposed to aerosolized B. anthracis spores. The Food and Drug
Administration has approved ciprofloxacin and doxycycline
for use as PEP against anthrax. When no information is avail-
able about the antimicrobial susceptibility of the implicated
strain of B. anthracis, initial PEP with ciprofloxacin or doxy-
cycline is recommended for adults and children (33–35).
Although fluoroquinolones and tetracyclines are not recom-
mended as first-choice drugs among children because of
adverse effects, these concerns might be outweighed by the
need for early treatment of pregnant women and children
exposed to B. anthracis after a terrorist attack. As soon as the
organism’s susceptibility to penicillin has been confirmed,
prophylactic therapy for children and pregnant women should
be changed to oral amoxicillin. B. anthracis is not susceptible
to cephalosporins and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole; there-
fore, these agents should not be used for prophylaxis (33–35).
The incubation period to onset of clinical symptoms for
inhalational anthrax can be as short as 24 hours (5). There-
fore, after a positive ADS signal, confirmation should be
obtained from an LRN laboratory and PEP started as soon as
possible, preferably within 15 hours after onset of the collec-
tion period that yielded the positive signal. Additional data
are needed on outcomes from inhalational anthrax where
onsets of PEP varied after exposure to B. anthracis.
Pre-event planning should include measures to ensure timely
transport and receipt of an LRN laboratory result. The deci-
sion to begin PEP should be made on the basis of risk for
B. anthracis exposure, including likelihood of aerosol expo-
sure to the powder (1), threat assessment in conjunction with
law enforcement, validity of preliminary laboratory testing of
the suspicious substance, and logistics of initiating an inter-
vention. Epidemiologic and laboratory test data might indi-
cate that certain persons started on PEP were not exposed and
that PEP can be discontinued. Persons who potentially have
been exposed to B. anthracis should be followed medically for
signs and symptoms of disease; in addition, severe adverse
events associated with postexposure antibiotics or vaccine
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should be identified and reported to local health authorities.
PEP should proceed as follows:
• Positive LRN PCR assay — a 3-day course of prophylaxis
is initiated.
• Negative LRN culture — prophylaxis is discontinued.
• Positive LRN culture — a 60-day course is completed
and a 3-dose regimen of anthrax vaccine is initiated in
accordance with IND protocols.
Every employer who uses an ADS device is responsible for
coordinating in advance PEP distribution procedures through
agreements with collaborating partners, including public
health authorities. Planning should include arrangements for
rapid access to an initial 3-day course of antibiotics to ensure
that prophylaxis can begin as soon as possible after B. anthracis
exposure has been confirmed by an LRN PCR assay. Antibi-
otics deployed from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)
can take 12 hours to deliver after the federal decision to deploy.
Alternatives for securing an initial 3-day course of antibiot-
ics near the PDC site might include maintaining an inven-
tory on-site or making arrangements with local pharmacies,
medical centers, or hospitals to maintain sufficient invento-
ries on the employers’ behalf. Which of these options is most
appropriate will depend on local conditions and capacities
(e.g., the number of potentially affected employees, logistics
associated with release and recall of employees, and medical
resources in the area). When addressing this concern, employ-
ers are strongly encouraged to work with their local public
health departments to ensure that quantity and dosage require-
ments are met and that plans for rapid access and delivery are
established and practiced through periodic drills.
Conclusion
Devices that detect agents of terrorism in the environment
have the potential to decrease the time required to detect a
terrorist event and therefore improve the potential for
preventing illness and interrupting further exposure and
contamination. In multiple U.S. cities, environmental detec-
tion systems (e.g., BioWatch) have been implemented to
assist in detecting releases. These systems typically work by
employing air-sampling filters, with the filter needing to be
removed periodically and sent to a laboratory for testing. Use
of an ADS, in which sampled air is tested internally, can
decrease the lag time between release of an agent and its
detection.
Although environmental detection devices are being
deployed, the need to better assess their effectiveness should
be considered, including studies to evaluate the benefit of these
approaches in preventing terrorism-related illness. CDC will
work with employers and state and local public health agen-
cies to identify opportunities to do this. These recommenda-
tions will be revised and updated as new information becomes
available. CDC will also continue to collaborate with employ-
ers and state and local public health agencies to ensure a swift
and effective response to positive ADS signals.
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This report summarizes West Nile virus (WNV) surveillance
data reported to CDC through ArboNET and by states and
other jurisdictions as of August 7, 2002.
United States
During the reporting period of July 31–August 7, a total of
68 laboratory-positive human cases of WNV-associated ill-
ness were reported from Louisiana (n=40), Mississippi (n=23),
Texas (n=four), and Illinois (n=one). During the same
period, WNV infections were reported in 447 dead crows,
263 other dead birds, 42 horses, and 183 mosquito pools.
During 2002, a total of 112 human cases with laboratory
evidence of recent WNV infection have been reported from
Louisiana (n=71), Mississippi (n=28), Texas (n=12), and Illi-
nois (n=one). Five deaths have been reported, all from Louisi-
ana. Among the 98 cases with available data, 59 (60%)
occurred among men; the median age was 55 years (range:
3–88 years), and the dates of illness onset ranged from June 10
to July 29.In addition, 1,076 dead crows and 827 other dead birds
with WNV infection were reported from 34 states, New York
City, and the District of Columbia (Figure 1); 87 WNV
infections in horses have been reported from 12 states
(Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Mississippi, North Dakota, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, and Texas). During 2002, WNV seroconversions have
been reported in 52 sentinel chicken flocks from Florida,
Nebraska, and Pennsylvania; and 425 WNV-positive mos-
quito pools have been reported from 12 states (Alabama, Geor-
gia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia), New
York City, and the District of Columbia.
West Nile Virus Activity — United States, July 31–August 7, 2002,
and Louisiana, January 1–August 7, 2002
INSIDE
683
Outbreak of Salmonella Serotype Javiana Infections —
Orlando, Florida, June 2002
684
Childhood Lead Poisoning Associated with Tamarind
Candy and Folk Remedies — California, 1999–2000
686
Human Rabies — California, 2002
688




Recent human WNV infection and animal WNV activity
Animal WNV activity only
District ofColumbia
* As of August 7, 2002.
FIGURE 1. Areas reporting West Nile virus (WNV) activity —
United States, 2002*
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